Political reinforcement learners.

Politics can seem home to the most calculating and yet least rational elements of humanity. How might we systematically characterize this spectrum of political cognition? Here, we propose reinforcement learning (RL) as a unified framework to dissect the political mind. RL describes how agents algorithmically navigate complex and uncertain domains like politics. Through this computational lens, we outline three routes to political differences, stemming from variability in agents' conceptions of a problem, the cognitive operations applied to solve the problem, or the backdrop of information available from the environment. A computational vantage on maladies of the political mind offers enhanced precision in assessing their causes, consequences, and cures.

A (Dis-)information Theory of Revealed and Unrevealed Preferences: Emerging Deception and Skepticism via Theory of Mind.

In complex situations involving communication, agents might attempt to mask their intentions, exploiting Shannon's theory of information as a theory of misinformation. Here, we introduce and analyze a simple multiagent reinforcement learning task where a buyer sends signals to a seller via its actions, and in which both agents are endowed with a recursive theory of mind. We show that this theory of mind, coupled with pure reward-maximization, gives rise to agents that selectively distort messages and become skeptical towards one another. Using information theory to analyze these interactions, we show how savvy buyers reduce mutual information between their preferences and actions, and how suspicious sellers learn to reinterpret or discard buyers' signals in a strategic manner.

Metacognitive computations for information search: Confidence in control.

The metacognitive sense of confidence can play a critical role in regulating decision making. In particular, a lack of confidence can justify the explicit, potentially costly, instrumental acquisition of extra information that might resolve uncertainty. Human confidence is highly complex, and recent computational work has suggested a statistically sophisticated tapestry behind the information that governs both the making and monitoring of choices. However, the consequences of the form of such confidence computations for search have yet to be understood. Here, we reveal extra richness in the use of confidence for information seeking by formulating joint models of action, confidence, and information search within a Bayesian and reinforcement learning framework. Through detailed theoretical analysis of these models, we show the intricate normative downstream consequences for search arising from more complex forms of metacognition. For example, our results highlight how the ability to monitor errors or general metacognitive sensitivity impact seeking decisions and can generate diverse relationships between action, confidence, and the optimal search for information. We also explore whether empirical search behavior enjoys any of the characteristics of normatively derived prescriptions. More broadly, our work demonstrates that it is crucial to treat metacognitive monitoring and control as closely linked processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Dogmatism manifests in lowered information search under uncertainty.

When knowledge is scarce, it is adaptive to seek further information to resolve uncertainty and obtain a more accurate worldview. Biases in such information-seeking behavior can contribute to the maintenance of inaccurate views. Here, we investigate whether predispositions for uncertainty-guided information seeking relate to individual differences in dogmatism, a phenomenon linked to entrenched beliefs in political, scientific, and religious discourse. We addressed this question in a perceptual decision-making task, allowing us to rule out motivational factors and isolate the role of uncertainty. In two independent general population samples (n = 370 and n = 364), we show that more dogmatic participants are less likely to seek out new information to refine an initial perceptual decision, leading to a reduction in overall belief accuracy despite similar initial decision performance. Trial-by-trial modeling revealed that dogmatic participants placed less reliance on internal signals of uncertainty (confidence) to guide information search, rendering them less likely to seek additional information to update beliefs derived from weak or uncertain initial evidence. Together, our results highlight a cognitive mechanism that may contribute to the formation of dogmatic worldviews.